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The paper presents an intertemporal utility model that determines the effects of elections on 
the public expenditure composition. 
Conventional political budget cycle models describe incumbents as concerned only with the 
conditions that guarantee re-appointment. Aiming at achieving re-election, incumbents behave 
opportunistically in order to seduce voters about their political performance. The paper 
introduces another motivation for the manipulation of the public expenditure mix near elections: 
the incumbent’s concern with her future utility in the case of defeat. 
We provide data to suggest that both central and local governments in the European Union 
do mqanipulate the budget composition around election moments. In order to rationalise this 
observation, the paper proposes a model where voters and incumbent are rational, have 
complete information and no bias towards any category of public expenditure, namely 
consumption expenditure or investment expenditure. The paper shows that even under these 
extreme conditions, an electorally induced cycle on public expenditure mix is still expected, one 
where consumption expenditure raises relative to investment expenditure in pre-election 
periods. This opportunistic budget manipulation follows from two facts. First, any decision an 
incumbent makes on consumption expenditure pays back political dividends during the same 
period the expenditure is incurred, while any investment expenditure only becomes visible to 
voters with a one-period delay. Second, re-election is an uncertain event, which makes the 
second state of nature valuable. Outside politics, the incumbents’ pay back is a direct function 
of the voters’ assessment of the incumbents’ job while in office.  
The model is then extended to accommodate the scenario where voters and society at large 
do not share preferences. When voters or society evidence a preference prone to one of the 
public expenditure categories, a bias towards such category emerges in post-election periods. In 
pre-election periods two cases are found. Consumption expenditures exceed investment 
expenditures if either voters or society prefer the former category at the margin. The cycle’s 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Casual observation easily detects current expenditure rising faster than capital 
expenditure in the run to the forthcoming election and the reverse pattern soon 
afterwards, or transfer payments increased in pre-electoral periods and taxes lifted right 
afterwards. The press is keen to recognise these policy cycles as a reflection of politics 
and the economics literature has studied them for a long time—the political business 
cycle (PBC) literature. The dominant perspective regards policy-makers as opportunist 
agents that use the (fiscal) policy tools they control to maximise their re-election 
chances—Nordhaus (1989), Shachar (1993), Gärtner (1994), Frey (1997), and Persson 
and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 16; 1990, Ch. 5). 
  Recently, Baleiras (1997) and Baleiras and Santos (2000, 2003) have looked for 
politico-economic determinants of stop-and-go patterns on government expenditure. 
These patterns are characterised by expansionary moves in pre-electoral periods 
followed by more or less serious contractions in post-electoral periods. Their 
explanation diverges from the dominant view in the sense that incumbent politicians do 
not maximise their re-election chances: they rather maximise their future utility over the 
two states of nature associated with any democratic election: victory and defeat. This 
standpoint is particularly relevant for local incumbents because their chances of finding 
a suitable political appointment following an electoral defeat are definitely weaker than 
for central government leaders. Policy-makers have a self-interest to induce stop-and-go 
cycles because their concern for the upcoming electoral uncertainty entails a 
probabilistic discount of the future (in the sense of post-electoral) public expenditure. 
Thus, one euro of expenditure today, while in office, renders more utility than one euro 
of expenditure tomorrow, when they can either be in office again or not. 
  Those authors addressed government expenditure as a homogeneous variable. 
We extend their framework to try to rationalise cycles on public expenditure mix. We 
are therefore interested to study the underlying causes for changes over time in the 
shares of current and capital outlays. Like them, we give away of policy errors and 
myopic expectations as possible justifications for such cycles and focus on inherently 
rational and forward-looking behaviour on the part of all players: the incumbent 
politician, voters and society at large. Our reasoning follows from the perception that 
current and capital expenditure in a given year pay political dividends back with 
different time frames. Typically, most current expenditure items (civil servant wages,   2
welfare compensations, etc.) give the electorate immediate benefits, which translate into 
ego-returns for the incumbent leader in the short run, that is, before the upcoming 
electoral contest for sure. By contrast, capital outlays today help to produce durable 
public goods that become politically visible only much later, with their full payback 
arriving very likely only after the forthcoming election. 
  The material is organised as follows. Section 2 displays international data on 
expenditure mix at different government layers aiming at motivating the reader for the 
empirical relevance of the subject. The model is designed in Section 3. The basic result, 
emergence of a political business cycle in expenditure mix, is derived in Section 4. 
Section 5 gives the electorate and society at large an active role and explores the 
implications for mix cycling that stem from possible differences among them on time 
preferences. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Motivation 
 
Most PBC literature has focused on the level of public spending or the deficit. 
Surprisingly, little relevance has been given to the expenditure composition, namely to 
the budget shares of consumption and investment outlays. 
However, international data reveal frequent biases towards consumption on pre-
electoral periods. As examples, the cases of the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Italy are 
reported in Graph I. It displays the difference between the share of consumption 
expenditure and the share of investment expenditure for each central government. The 
vertical lines identify the general election moments. Broadly speaking, it seems that 
most peaks of that difference occur in the last two or three quarters before the poll. 
   3
Graph I – Public expenditure budget cycles electorally induced by central 
governments 
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Sources: IMF – Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
Note: Vertical lines represent the periods when a bias towards consumption expenditures is expected 
and correspond to the election year when it occurs in the last six months and to the year before 
election when it occurs in the first six months. 
 
A similar pattern can be found among subnational governments, provided that we 
interpret the expenditure items carefully. It is well known that subnational authorities 
control fewer fiscal instruments capable of intra-tenure cycling (Baleiras and Costa, 
2004), yet there are some. For example, Portuguese municipalities are responsible for a   4
whole array of investment goods where some (viaducts and road works) are likely to 
pay back within a relative short notice and others pay back later (social housing, school 
buildings, and sewerage infrastructures). It is shown in Graph II that the share of the 
former tends to exceed the latter’s on pre-electoral years. 
 




Source: Portuguese Local Government Bureau  –  Annual Local Finance Statistics 
Note: Vertical lines correspond to election years in which a manipulation is expected towards 
those investment expenditure categories that become visible to voters in a shorter period of time. 
Local elections were always held in December. 
 
The following question emerges when both Graphs are analysed: Is the incumbent’s 
search for voters’ assessment the single drive beyond the political budget cycle on 
public expenditure mix? Or are there any other reasons, besides the re-election quest, 
that motivate incumbents to manipulate the public budget beyond re-election concerns? 
The theoretical model proposed in Sections 3 and through 5 addresses these issues 
and, interestingly, will show that such cycles may occur even when the incumbents have 
no self-interest to induce them. 
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3.  The model 
 
Each electoral tenure is made of two periods (1 and 2)
1 and the incumbent must 
decide, in each period, the budgetary shares of consumption (gA) and investment 
expenditures ( gB ), with gg AB += 1, for simplicity. 
Any decision an incumbent makes on consumption expenditure pays back political 
dividends immediately, i.e., during the same period the expenditure is incurred.  
In contrast, any investment expenditure, decided in one period, becomes visible to 
voters only in the following period. Putting it another way, investment expenditures 
only give utility to the incumbent with a one-period delay. 
Consider the budgetary choices of period 2 (the pre-electoral period). Any euro spent 
in consumption gives the incumbent for sure some utility in the very same period. 
However, any euro spent on investment during period 2 will only give the incumbent 
some utility in the following period if she is re-elected—an uncertain event. This delay 
phenomenon occurs also in period 1. However, as the investment expenditure decided 
in period 1 will become visible in period 2, the incumbent’s utility from that 
expenditure is certain. 
The incumbent decides expenditure composition at the beginning of each period and 
her utility is represented by vg i bg which is twice continuously differentiable, with 
'0 ,  ' '0 vv ><  for i A B = , . This satisfaction can only be enjoyed while the incumbent is 
in office. 
Voters’ utility is explained by the following expression: 
s awg wg a wg wg AA BB =+ + − +
12 12 1 ch chb g ch ch , with  '0 ,  ' '0 ww >< . Parameter a 
(a ∈ 01 , ) captures the voters’ preferences for budget composition between 
consumption and investment expenditures. When aa > 05 05 . < . b g it represents a bias 
for consumption (investment) expenditures. 
Re-election probability, π , is a function of voters’ satisfaction level: π π = s b g, 
π ∈ 01 ,  and π'> 0. 
                                                           
1 Several PBC models, essentially those where asymmetric information prevails, include a positive 
discount rate. Since the model of this paper relies on full information assumption and seeking for 
simplicity, the insertion of a positive discount rate was set aside. However, it could be also considered in 
the model without changing results qualitatively.    6
If it is assumed that voters prefer no budget distortion or, equivalently, that no cycle 
occurs during the two-tenure period, the wider the cycle (i.e. the difference between gA 
and  gB  choices) in each period, the smaller is s and thus the lower will be the 
incumbent’s re-election chances. In contrast, the more likely the defeat scenario 
[probability 1−π s b g], the wider the cycle becomes. 
In this context, the best income an incumbent may achieve in case of electoral defeat 
(outside income) becomes increasingly important. 
Outside income is denoted by  y in which  yy s = b g, with  y'> 0. This income is 
endogenous and depends on the entrepreneurial community’s evaluation of the 
incumbent’s performance while in office. The entrepreneurial community reward the 
incumbent’s performance by ensuring her an outside office job. That community is part 
of the electorate, thus sharing voters’ preferences. The greater the utility prospective 
employers (that is to say voters) retrieve from the incumbent’s budgetary decisions, the 
higher will be the reward an incumbent could expect in case of election defeat through 
outside income. In synthesis, outside income is an increasing function of the voters’ 
satisfaction level. 
As  s decreases, π  and  y decrease as well. These are the two disciplinary pressures 
against the incumbent’s self-interest to overspend in public consumption  gA > 05 . bg .  
While in office, the incumbent chooses twice the budget composition, one in period 1 
and another in period 2. Given the visibility lag of investment expenditure, the utility 
from these choices spans for three periods: periods 1 and 2 of the current tenure and the 
post-electoral future (period 3). Naturally, the latter utility is contingent upon the 
electoral outcome. 
Formally, the fiscal choice of period 1 generates an ego-return vg A
1 c hin period 1 and 
an ego-return vg B
1 c h in period 2; the fiscal choice of period 2 induces ego-return 
vg A
2 c hin period 2 and an expected ego-return πvg B
2 c hin period 3. Moreover, period 3 
utility in case of electoral defeat is given by  1−π b g b g xy. So, the incumbent’s inter-
temporal utility function is: 
Uv g v g v g v g x y ABA B =+++ + −
112 2 1 c h c h c h c h b g b g ππ . 
Knowing that gg BA =− 1 , in each period, the above expression can be rewritten as:   7
Uv g v g v g v g x y AA A A =+ − ++ − + −
11 2 2 11 1 c h c h c h c h b g b g ππ  
 
The incumbent’s problem becomes an optimisation problem with just two choice 
variables,  gA
1  and gA
2. In this sense, the incumbent will have to find the utility 
maximising levels of consumption expenditures in each period. 
Equivalently, 
M a x U vg v g vg sv g s xys












=+ − ++ − + −
=+ + − − + −
chc hchb g ch b g ch b g ch
ch chb g ch ch
ππ
         
                 (3.1) 
 
It is further assumed that vg x y A 1
2 −> c h b g which means the incumbent prefers the 
ego-rent from investment expenditure to the outside income. Although a technical 
necessity, this assumption squares well with the informal perception that most 
politicians prefer re-election runs to retreats if allowed to do so.  
 
4. Political budget cycle 
 
Given the incumbent’s budgetary decision and the manner how it gives her utility, in 
each period, as described above, it is reasonable to ask if under these conditions there is 
an incentive for the incumbent to engage into budget composition manipulation and 
how. 
The intuition tells that, given the voters’ full information and unbiased preferences, 
the incumbent gains nothing from budget manipulation in period 1. This is so since the 
incumbent neither improves her reputation near voters nor faces any uncertainty on 
investment expenditure utility in period 2. 
However, in period 2, the incumbent has an incentive to incur into a political budget 
cycle. This results from the fact that investment expenditures, in period 2, flow 
probabilistically into the next period utility. In this framework, the incumbent has thus 
an incentive to spend on consumption expenditures rather than on investment 
expenditures. Despite the loss on re-election chances that this behaviour generates, the 
incumbent still has a motive to prefer to spend more on consumption goods. 
The following Proposition shows formally these results: 
   8
Proposition 1—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle: Even when the 
electorate shows no preference for a cycle  a = 05 . b g,  
i)  a political budget cycle is found in the pre-election period, given by gA
2 05 > . , 
and 
ii)   there is no cycle in the post-election period, gA
1 05 = . . 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 1. 
 
Interpreting the result, it can be said that the incumbent has a total opportunistic 
behaviour, which means that she has no ideological bias for gA or gB . Any eventual 
composition cycle follows only from the differences in political visibility of gA and gB  
during her legislature period. Moreover, this visibility differential matters in period 2 
only, since she is uncertain about being re-elected and thus cannot guarantee a 
satisfaction from her investment expenditures choices in this period. In other words, one 
unit of consumption expenditure in period 2 generates higher utility than one unit 
attached to investment expenditure in the same period, because the latter is 
probabilistically discounted to the ensuing period 3.  
The voters, in contrast, have an ideology in the model represented by parameter a, 
as already stated, which reveals a definite preference between consumption expenditure 
and investment expenditure. The higher is a , the more biased are voters’ preferences 
towards consumption expenditures. 
The incumbent, given her ideological neutrality, does not have an idiosyncratic 
incentive to increase investment expenditures in period 1 when voters evidence no bias 
on preferences regarding expenditure composition. However, given the investment 
expenditure delay on utility, the incumbent cannot retrieve satisfaction from investment 
expenditure decided in period 2 (pre-election period), unless she gets re-elected. This 
induces the incumbent to spend more of her last period budget on consumption 
expenditures, thus leading to a budget cyclegg AB
22 > . 
In this framework a cycle is only observed in the second half of legislature, since 
voters prefer no cycle, which gives the incumbent no reason to distort budget 
composition at the first period in office. In fact, any deviation away from a half   9
budgetary partition, in period 1, reduces voters’ satisfaction, thus decreasing the 
incumbent’s re-election probability as well as her outside income. 
 
5. Preference differences between the electorate and society at large 
 
Now the following question is introduced: Is it reasonable that the entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to pay for the (ex-) incumbent still reflects the electorate’s assessment of her 
performance when non-voters show a significant weight in population? Probably not, 
because voters are not representative of society’s welfare, under these circumstances.  
This analysis becomes more interesting if it were taken in consideration that the 
preferences of voters and non-voters are usually misaligned in the sense that they do not 
evidence the same priorities. 
Following this perspective, the polar cases will be in contrast where: 
i)  society at large prefer no cycle at all and voters prefer a cycle and  
ii)  society prefer a cycle and voters prefer no cycle at all. 
It is plausible to ask what circumstances may lead the electorate to prefer one type of 
expenditure and society to prefer an equal partition between the two types of 
expenditures or vice-versa. 
In fact some kind of expenditure satisfies more directly voters and other types of 
expenditure give more direct satisfaction to non-voters. For the first type of 
expenditures it can be referred the defence expenditures or economic services like 
transportation and communication expenditures. Examples of the second type contain 
expenditures on health, education and social housing construction, where beneficiary 
groups include much larger fractions of youth and migrant population who typically do 
not vote. 
In this sense, gB  and  gA are re-interpreted respectively, as the first and second type 
of these expenditures. 
Under the existence of preference misalignment between voters and non-voters, an 
incumbent wishing to please the former exclusively will bring a negative spillover 
effect on non-voters, since the last ones will find a budget composition different from 
their most desired partition.
2 
                                                           
2 O’Toole and Strobl (1994) argued that “government expenditure, both in size and composition, will 
more accurately reflect the tastes of the entire eligible-to-vote population under compulsory voting rules.   10
This gives some insights that those countries where a great number of voters do not 
actually exercise their right to vote, it is expected that incumbents distort budget 
composition in order to favour effective electors.
3  
In this sense, it is introduced in the model, at this point, a contra-incentive 
reproduced by an outside income related to incumbent’s social welfare performance. 
The outside income will appear here as a recognition measure of the incumbent’s 
merit or reputation by society. The prospective employers’ evaluation of the 
incumbent’s performance is now more enlarged. Instead of focusing exclusively on 
strict economic results, the entrepreneurial community will correlate outside income to 
the incumbent’s social goals achievement. 
In this perspective, the two following propositions discuss how the political 
expenditure cycle evolves when society and voters exhibit different preferences. It is 
shown in Proposition 2 and in Corollary 1 that when either voters or society evidence a 
marginal preference for consumption expenditures, the incumbent distorts the budget 
composition, increasing the later share in both post-election and pre-election periods. 
An alternative case is also discussed here where either voters or society prefer a 
budget mix biased towards investment expenditure. Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 show 




5.1. Model redefinition 
 
The society’s welfare is evaluated by the following expression: 
Wc w g w g c w g w g AA BB =+ + − +
12 12 1 ch chb g ch ch , with ww ', ' ' >< 00 . Parameter c 
(c ∈ 01 , ) indicates the budget composition between gA and gB  expenditures as 
desired by society. When cc > 05 05 . < . b g it represents a bias in favour of the first type 
(second type) expenditures. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
In contrast, under voluntary voting rules the composition of government spending is biased towards the 
preferences of the voting population”. 
3  As O’Toole and Strobl (1994) referred, it is the voters with lower income as well as reduced 
instruction level who, usually, having less information about politics, do not vote.  
   11
As referred, outside income is a measure of the incumbent’s social reputation. In this 
sense,  yW b g is a result of social welfare and not a strictly outcome of voters’ 
satisfaction. By now it is assumed that the entrepreneurial community is willing to pay 
the incumbent at least the same or an higher income than the one she would achieve if 
outside income was related to economic performance alone. If it is not the case, then the 
incumbent will have no incentive to care about society’s preferences. In fact, if outside 
income is higher when it is just a function of voters’ satisfaction, then there is a return 
to the basic model presented in (4.1). 
In this framework, the incumbent’s problem becomes: 
MaxU v g v g v g s v g s x y W
st s awg wg a w g w g
















=+ − ++ − + −
=+ + − − + −
=+ + − − + −
c h c h c h b g c h b g c h b g c h
ch chb g ch ch
ch chbg ch ch
ππ
  
       
            (4.1) 
 
5.2. Further results 
 
As a first case, assume voters and society have different preferences, such that the 
former prefer no cycle (a = 05 . ) and the latter have a bias towards consumption 
expenditures (c > 05 .) .  
 
Proposition 2—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when society 
prefers a cycle in favour of consumption expenditure and voters prefer the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, voters prefer no cycle (a = 05 . ) and society favours consumption 
expenditure (c > 05 . ), then a political budget cycle emerges in both periods, such that 
current expenditure exceeds capital expenditure in the optimum  gt A
t ~
., , >= L
NM O
QP 05 12   . 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 2. 
   12
A similar result to Proposition 2 is found if voters rather than society evidence a 
preference bias towards gA expenditure type (a > 05 . ) and society prefer an absence of 
a cycle (c = 05 .) .  
 
Corollary 1—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when voters prefer a 
cycle in favour of consumption expenditure and society prefers the absence of a 
cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population satisfaction, society 
prefers no cycle (c = 05 . ) and voters favour consumption expenditure (a > 05 .) ,  t h e n  
a political budget cycle emerges in both periods, such that current expenditure 
exceeds capital expenditure in the optimum  gt A
t ~
., , >= L
NM O
QP 05 12   . 
 
Proof:  
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of cycle emerges.         
 
The other case in which voters prefer a concentration on gB  expenditures (a < 05 .)  
and society prefer no cycle (c = 05 . ) is presented now. 
 
Proposition 3—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when voters 
prefer a cycle in favour of investment expenditure and society prefers the 
absence of a cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population 
satisfaction, society prefers no cycle (c = 05 . ) and voters favour investment 
expenditure (a < 05 . ), then  
i)  the political budget cycle emerges in period 1 and, 
ii)  the cycle type in period 2 is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix 3. 
 
The cycle type in period 2, under the conditions described in Proposition 3, remains 
an empirical question. Putting it another way, it will be possible to evaluate empirically 
if in a country with a representative weight of non-voters, the cycle type has the same   13
nature as common preferences  gA
2 05 > . c h or, in opposition, if it occurs either an absence 
of a cycle or a bias to gB  expenditures. 
 
The nature of the cycle described in Proposition 3 stands if society rather than voters 
prefer gB  expenditures (c < 05 . ) and voters prefer no cycle (a = 05 .) .   
Corollary 2—the inter-temporal political expenditure cycle when society prefers 
a cycle in favour of investment expenditure and voters prefer the absence of a 
cycle: When outside income is an outcome of total population satisfaction, voters 
prefer no cycle (a = 05 . ) and society favours investment expenditure (c < 05 .) ,  t h e n  
i)  the political budget cycle emerges in period 1 and, 
ii)  the cycle type in period 2 is ambiguous. 
 
Proof: 
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of cycle emerges.      
 
 
5.3. Interpretation of the results 
  
The intuition of the two last results can be explained as follows. If society’s 
preferences differ from voters’ ones, the incumbent will face a trade-off effect: pleasing 
voters improves her re-election chances but decreases her outside income, since 
incumbent has made options that are far away from the ones most preferred by society. 
Ii is useful to recall here that, in this case, incumbent’s reputation is evaluated according 
to her social welfare performance. 
This means that when incumbent pegs social welfare to her utility function 
(Proposition 2 and 3), the political expenditure cycles are no longer as predicted when 
she looks only into the voters’ interest and her own (Proposition 1).  
Under the case in Proposition 2 (ca > = 05 . ), given the incumbent’s ideology 
absence, in period 1 she will follow society’s preferences. In this case, the budget 
composition is distorted in favour of gA expenditures, thus improving the incumbent’s 
outside reward. In period 2, both society and the incumbent’s self-interest on gA 
expenditures push for a  gA > 05 .  cycle.  In this case, the incumbent supports some cost   14
on votes but increases its outside income in case of defeat. Besides, a bias is expected to 
gA expenditures in period 1 and period 2.  
The previous argument is also valid for the case in which voters’ preferences are 
biased to gB  expenditures (ac < = 05 . ), presented in Proposition 3. Given the 
incumbent’s preference absence for any type of expenditure, in period 1 a PBC is found, 
which increases gB  expenditures, thus favouring voters and improving the incumbent’s 
re-election probability. Given the incumbent’s re-appointment concern, she has an 
incentive to spend more on gB  expenditures also in period 2, compared to common 
preferences. However, the incumbent’s self-interest is opposite to voters’. Thus, these 
two effects can lead to an absence of a cycle (the two-effect balance) or a bias in favour 
of any type of expenditure. A budget composition option where gB  expenditures are 
privileged seems also very plausible to the incumbent. Although imposing some 
dissatisfaction on all society, it pleases voters, first constituencies that give an 
immediate reward to the incumbent: the vote.  
This analysis converges to other authors’ results mentioned above in which the 
incumbents tend to satisfy particular constituencies, specifically those who vote. 
The conclusion is that, in both cases, when outside income depends on society’s 
preferences, which are not aligned with voters ones, a cycle will emerge in period 1. 
The larger the number of non-voters in total population, the higher the impact of a 
given preference differential between society and voters. The society’s behaviour is 
more differentiated from the voters’ one as the weight of non-voters in society 
increases. Only in this case, different preferences are expected since non-voters 
influence society’s welfare evaluation. If non-voters are not a significant fraction of 
population, an incumbent who chooses a budget composition that satisfies voters’ 
preferences guarantees re-election and outside income is not penalised, since voters 
reflect society’s preferences. However, when voters and non-voters are not aligned in 
preferences, and simultaneously non-voters have weight in the total population, this is 
an incentive for the incumbent to change budget composition in order to accommodate 
the preferences of both types of population.  
 
   15
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Is it merely the re-election concern that mobilises incumbents to manipulate public 
expenditure composition?  
The paper has proved that even when 
1)  voters know the budget availability after the pre-electoral decision for investment 
expenditures as well as 
2)  the incumbent foresees perfectly her re-election chances, 
an intertemporal political budget expenditure cycle emerges with implications on 
expenditure mix. In this case, an expenditure cycle prone to consumption expenditures 
is expected in the pre-election period. Central governments increase the share of 
consumption expenditure whenever they come close to electoral contests and local 
governments increase the share of those expenditure categories that bring political 
dividends immediately. 
When the incumbent’s performance as perceived by society is brought into question, 
the incumbent faces two opposing incentives in the pre-election period. In fact, under 
this scenario, the incumbent finds herself into a dilemma whenever voters’ or society’s 
preferences favour investment expenditures. If she favours consumption expenditures, 
she displeases either voters or society, thus decreasing her re-election chances, in the 
former case, or her outside income if defeated in the next election contest, in the latter 
case. Given this opposing incentives faced by the incumbent in the pre-election period, 
it is not possible to know a priori the budget mix in that period.  
If either voters’ or society’s preferences are biased towards consumption 
expenditures, then the political budget cycle prone to such expenditure category 
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Appendix 1: 
The incumbent’s problem is given by expression (3.1): 
M a x U vg v g vg sv g s xys
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ch chb g ch ch
ππ
         
 
The objective function is twice differentiable and assumed to be strictly concave in 
order to ensure the existence of a unique and global maximum. Under this condition the 
first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterise the global extreme 
value, thus obviating the need for checking the second-order condition. 
The first order-conditions are:    17
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The two equations can be simplified to expressions (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) below, 
respectively: 
vg v g










bg bg c h c h bg c h bg {} c h bg c h e j
−−=
− − −− −− −  = ππ
(A.1.1) 
vg s v g
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 and  gA
2*
 denote the optimal solution to problem (3.1). 
 
Step i— Firstly, the focus is on period 1 expenditure composition, given by (A.1.1) 
above. 
As previously referred, it is expected that gg AB
11 0 −= . The following proof is made 
by contradiction. In this sense, suppose not. Under this scenario it could be found that 
gg AB
11 0 −>  or  gg AB
11 0 −< . 
Define  Ω≡ − − π' sx y s v g A b g b g chc h e j 1
2  as well as Ω
^
'' ≡− 1 π sx ys bg c h bg . Given the 
assumption  xy vg B bg c h −<




This allows to rewrite expression (A.1.1) as: 
vg v g a wg a w g AA A A '' ' '
11 1 1 11 1 ch c h chbg ch ej −−= FH IK
−− − ΩΩ -
^
.   18
Assuming that it could be  gg AB
11 0 −> , this means that gA
1 05 > . , given budget 
constraint. 
Thus, under this scenario it will be found a left-hand side strictly negative or 
equivalently  vg v g AA ''
11 1 c h c h <−. By the same token, wg w g AA ''
11 1 c h c h <− , which leads 
to  aw g a w g AA ''
11 11 0 chb g ch e j −− − <, given the basic assumption that a = 05 ..  
Jointly with  ΩΩ -
^ FH IK
< 0, this gives a right-hand side strictly positive, which is a 
contradiction. 
Thus, the conclusion is that gA
1  cannot be strictly larger than gB
1 . 
 
The other scenario is gg AB
11 0 −<  or, equivalently, gA
1 05 < . . In this situation it will 
be found vg v g AA ''
11 1 c h c h >− as well as wg w g AA ''
11 1 c h c h >− . Here the left-hand side is 
strictly positive. Knowing that  ΩΩ -
^ FH IK
< 0 as well that 
aw g a w g AA ''
11 11 0 chb g ch e j −− − >, in this case a right-hand side strictly negative is found. 
Thus, a contradiction is found again, which means that gA




1  is neither strictly bigger nor strictly smaller than gB
1 , well then 
this means that the equilibrium solution in period 1 can only be gg AB
11 = . 
 
Step ii— At this point there is a turn into the period 2 expenditure shares, given by 
expression (A.1.2): 
vg s v g









c h b g c h
b g b g c h c h b g c h b g {} c h b g c h e j
−− =
− − −− −− −
π
ππ       =
  
The rest of this proof replicates Baleiras and Vasco (2000). The following exposition 
proceeds by contradiction. Suppose, therefore, that the inequality gg AB
22 0 −>  is not 
fulfilled. Then,  gg AB
22 0 −≤  or gA
2 05 ≤ . , given the budget constraint in period 2. 
The left-hand side of the expression is strictly positive, because gA
2 05 ≤ .,  w h i c h  
implies that vg v g s v g AA A '' '
22 2 11 c h c h bgc h ≥−> − π .   19
Let return to the definition of Ω≡ − − π' sx y s v g A b g b g chc h e j 1
2  as well as 
Ω
^
'' ≡− 1 π sx ys bg c h bg , which are common in the two period first-order conditions. Given 
also the assumption xy vg B b g c h −<
2 0 and the signs of the primitive functions, then it is 
found Ω<0 and Ω
^
> 0, as previously stated.  
In this case, the right-hand side can now be written as 
ΩΩ − FH IK
−− −
^
'' aw g a w g AA
22 11 c h bg c h e j 
From  gA
2 05 ≤ .,   wg w g AA ''
22 1 c h c h ≥− , implying for a = 05 . t h a t  
aw g a w g AA ''
22 11 0 chb g ch e j −− − ≥. Therefore, the right-hand side of the expression 
becomes non-positive, which establishes a contradiction. 
Concluding, it can be said that gA
2  is strictly larger than gB
2  in the optimum.   
 
Appendix 2: 
Step i—First-order conditions of problem (4.1) 
∂
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Rearranging, it becomes: 
vg v g sx y W v g a wg a w g
sx yWc wg c w g
AA A A A
AA
'' ' ' '
'' ' '




c h c h b g b g c h c h ej c h b g c h ej
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        (A.2.1)   20
vg s v g sx y W v g a wg a w g
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Step ii—Cycle in period 1 





 solution, it could be gg AB
11
~~
= , or  gg AB
11
~~




If the solution were gA
1 05
~
. ≤ , given the signs of the primitive functions, 










. ≤ , the following inequality holds  aw g a w g AA ''
~~
11 11 0 F
HG I




KJ ≥ bg , this 
leads to a non-positive right-hand first term, given π'> 0 as well as 







, by assumption. With c > 05 .  and  gA
1 05
~
. ≤ , the inequality is 
given as  cw g c w g AA ''
~~
11 11 0 F
HG I




KJ > bg , jointly with w'> 0,  x'> 0 and  y'> 0, a 
negative right-hand second term will be found. 
Consequently, a negative right-hand side is found when  gA
1 05
~





 is neither equal nor strictly smaller than gB
1
~
, this means that, in this 




. > , thus leading to a political expenditure cycle in period 1.  
            




05 >  
Analysing now the period 2, with  yy W = b g and returning to expression (A.2.2), here 
recalled for the reader’s convenience:   21
vg s v g sx y W v g a wg a w g
sx yWc wg c w g
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. ≤ . More precisely, under gA
2 05
~
. ≤ , the expression (A.2.2) has a strictly positive 
left-hand side, given v'> 0 and π <1. When gA
2 05
~
. ≤  as well as a = 05 .,  t h e n  
aw g a w g AA ''
~~
22 11 0 F
HG I




KJ ≥ bg . Thus, a non-positive first term of right-hand side of 
expression (A.2.2) is found. Given c > 05 .  and  gA
2 05
~
. ≤ , a right-hand side second term 
strictly negative is found, since  cw g c w g AA ''
~~
22 11 0 F
HG I




KJ > bg . 
 This leads to a contradiction. Thus, gA
2 05
~
. ≤  is not a solution for problem (4.1).   
 
Appendix 3: 
Step i—Cycle nature in period 1 
For period 1 the expression is again given by (A.2.1):  
vg v g sx y W v g a wg a w g
sx yWc wg c w g
AA A A A
AA
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'' ' '




c h c h b g b g c h c h ej c h b g c h ej
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π                                     
. 
As previously, it is followed an exposition by contradiction. It is denoted 
Φ= − F
HG I





11 π sx yWc wg c w g AA bg c h bg b g '' ' '
~~
. 
Seeing now the hypothesis that gA
1 05
~
. ≥ , then, given the signs of the primitive 






KJ  and Φ ≤ 0. Given π'> 0 and xyW v g A b g ch ch e j −− < 10
2 , 
by assumption, as well as  aw g a w g AA ''
~~
11 11 0 F
HG I




KJ < bg , this leads to a positive 
first term. Thus a right-hand side with a positive sign is found, which establishes a 




 is neither equal nor larger than gB
1
~
, this means that in this case it 




. < , thus leading to a political expenditure cycle in period 1 as in 
Proposition 2. 
  
Step ii—Cycle nature in period 2 
The first-order conditions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) still apply. 
Returning to expression (A.2.2) in order to evaluate if there is a political budget 
cycle in period 2 when there are voters’ bias in preferences towards gB  expenditures.  
At this point it is tested if when a < 05 .  as well as c = 05 . , the equilibrium solution 








. >  can 




. >  as well as a < 05 .,  t h e n   aw g a w g AA ''
~~
22 11 0 F
HG I




KJ < bg . Thus a 
first term of right-hand side of expression (A.2.2) strictly positive is found. Given 
c = 05 .  and gA
2 05
~
. > , a second term also strictly positive is found, since 
cw g c w g AA ''
~~
22 11 0 F
HG I








. >  to be a solution to problem (4.1), it must also have a left-hand side 






KJ > πb g . However, it cannot be ensured, given 




>  is (is not) a possible solution in case π  is enough low (high) to make the left-




. < , a strictly positive left-hand side of expression (A.2.2) is found. The 
first term on the right-hand side has an ambiguous sign, which depends on 








KJ bg  being positive or negative, given a < 05 .,  w'> 0, 





. Given c = 05 .  and gA
2 05
~
. < , a right-hand   23
second term strictly negative is found, since  cw g c w g AA ''
~~
22 11 0 F
HG I




KJ > bg . This 
leads to a right-hand side taking any value, which leads to an ambiguous result. Once 
again it cannot be ensured that gA
2
~




If it is considered gA
2 05
~
. = , then the left-hand side of expression (A.2.2) is strictly 
positive. On the right-hand side there is a first term strictly positive, given a < 05 .,  









. = . Thus, it can be said that gA
2 05
~
. =  is definitively a solution to problem (A.2.2) 
when voters have a preference bias to gB  expenditures. However, it cannot be 
guaranteed that this will be the only solution.  
Given the results it can be said that gA
2
~
 can take any value, i.e. gA
2
~
 can be equal, 
strictly bigger or strictly smaller than gB
2
~
.         
 